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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
”Climate change decision-making is essentially a sequential process under general uncertainty.” 
 
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2001) 
 
This thesis is about investments in heat and power plants, i.e., installations, which produce heat, 
electricity, cooling or their combination(s). Investments are sacrifices of current reserves for future 
benefits. The sacrifice takes place in the present or in the near future and is mostly relatively certain, 
while the reward comes later and is generally uncertain (Sharpe et al. 1999). The reward should 
compensate the investor for (1) the time the funds are committed, (2) the expected rate of inflation 
and (3) the uncertainty of the future payments (Reilly and Norton 1999). Real investments (in contrast 
to financial investments) involve some kind of tangible asset, such as land, machinery or factories 
(Sharpe et al. 1999). Real investments in energy infrastructure can broadly be divided to four 
categories: investments in heat and power plants; investments in transmission and distribution of 
electricity; investments in district heating and cooling networks; and investments in fuel supply. 
 
Businesses compete about investment capital in global financial markets. In the electric utility 
industry, the current regulatory and market volatility offers a wide array of attractive investment 
opportunities (e.g. Bullinger and Shetty, 2004). With the regulation existing by mid-2004, it is 
projected that the world electricity demand will double between 2002 and 2030 (a growth rate of 
2.5%/a), while most of the growth takes place in developing countries (IEA, 2004). In addition, a 
significant proportion of the existing capacity must be retired in many regions during that period. This 
implies a new capacity requirement of 4,800 GWe globally requiring an investment of around USD 
4,600 billion (Table 1). Furthermore, other final energy use in residential, services and industrial 
sectors is expected to grow by 16,000 TWh (37 %)1 until 2030, implying an additional demand for 
heat-only plants. All in all, it is recognized that “increased investment in the energy sector, from both 
public and private sources, is necessary.” (EDC, 2004). 
 
Table 1. Rough projections on the required new power generation capacity in GW. 
Region 2003-2010 2011-2020 2021-2030 
Finland1 3 4 7 
OECD Europe 8002,3 in total 
World2 1,100 1,700 2,000 
1 Based on Kara, 2004. 
2 Reference scenario taking into account policies and measures that had been adopted by mid-2004. Additional efforts to 
reach the targets of the Kyoto Protocol (see below) are not included (IEA, 2003, p. 350, 2004, p. 208). 
 
Major factors affecting investment in the power sector in the future decades are competition, market 
reform, environmental constraints and access to capital (IEA, 2003, p. 354). A significant - and 
potentially the most significant - environmental constraint is set by climate change mitigation. In the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), all major greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emitting countries decided to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 
2005). The UNFCCC entered into force in March 1994, and was followed by the Kyoto Protocol, 
which sets binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for specified industrialized countries. 
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005. On average, the industrialized countries 
                                                                
1 Own calculation based on IEA (2004). Includes petrochemical feedstocks. 
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having accepted binding targets2 to reduce their GHG emissions by 2.2% (excluding emission sinks) 
compared to the 1990 level by the end of the five-year period 2008-20123.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol includes provisions, which enable the Parties to trade with different types of 
greenhouse gas emission permits4. The GHG emission permit market already emerged on a 
voluntary non-Kyoto- compatible basis in the 90’s, but the volume remained small. In 2003, the 
trading volume was some 80 Mt and in 2004 it was 124 Mt, with an increasing momentum and growth 
specifically in Kyoto-compatible transactions (Lecocq and Capoor, 2005, 2004). By September 2005, 
the trading volume in Europe alone has been close to 200 Mt (based on GreenStream Network, 
2005; Lecocq and Capoor, 2005). 
 
The value of emission permits and other impacts caused by the trading systems are new sources of 
uncertainty in heat and power capacity investments. Heat and power plants typically have a long 
economic lifespan, of 20-40 years, and the prospects of climate policy beyond 2012 are unclear. 
Further, science on climate change gives continuously new results, which implies that the framework 
for policy-making may change. Therefore, the value of an emission permit can be seen as a 
stochastic process, which implies that the value of the permits evolves over time in a way that is at 
least in part random (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 60). More formally, a stochastic process X is a family 
of random variables, defined on some common probability space, indexed by an index-set I, which 
often represents time (Bingham and Kiesel, 2004, p. 77). 
 
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the implications of these new 
regulatory instruments, tradable emission permits, in investments in heat and power generation. The 
main research question is thus how emissions trading – taking into account the stochastic value of an 
emission permit -- affects investment decisions. The research question can be looked at from 
different perspectives, such as those of: 
• a capital investor: how does emissions trading change the expected return of an investment? 
How does emissions trading affect the risk of an investment? How should these investments be 
optimally managed? 
• the regulator or a non-governmental organization: how does emissions trading and its different 
design options affect the volume (in number of plants or MW) and quality (fuel and technology) 
of investments? What are the macro-level economic, social or environmental outcomes? 
 
In an investment problem, capital investors are typically more interested in either detailed project-
level analyses or performance of portfolios of a limited number of projects. On the other hand, the 
regulator is more focused on aggregated analyses and (very) large portfolios, unless an individual 
project is very large, such as a nuclear power plant. As the total impact depends on a large number of 
small analyses, understanding the mechanisms of individual investment decisions is, however, the 
key for larger-scale analyses (Dinica, 2005). For example, Haas et al. (2004) point out the increase in 
investors’ risk caused by regulatory uncertainty, when policies are changed. Policies implemented by 
the regulator can cause unforeseen policy outcomes, if the project-level decision-making is not fully 
perceived. 
 
The thesis consists of individual articles, which (1) have different perspectives to the investment 
problem; (2) deal with different kinds of tradable permit systems (see Section 2.1. below); and (3) 
                                                                
2 A total of 156 countries (as of 16.9.2005) have ratified the Protocol, of which 34 have binding 
reduction targets (UNFCCC, 2005) 
3 Average emissions of the five-year period are used as the unit of measurement. 
4 Terminology is not homogenous, e.g., in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
permit is a licence to operate a carbon dioxide emitting activity. The term “permit” is used here as a 
generic term for different kinds of carbon assets (see e.g. Jones and Morlot, 1992; Janssen, 2001; 
Rosenzweig et al., 2002; and Springer, 2003). 
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consider different type(s) of stochastic variables related to the investment problem. The implications 
are analyzed and discussed in association with several technologies. The common denominator is 
the presence of a tradable permit system in investment problems of the energy industry. 
 
This introductory article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on tradable permit 
systems in general, and Section 3 the relevant literature on investments. The focus of Section 3 is on 
the impacts of the tradable permit system on investments into heat and power capacity. In both 
sections, the contributions of this thesis relative to the body of knowledge are identified. Section 4 
presents the individual articles and their key results. Concluding remarks are made in Section 5. 
 
2. TRADABLE EMISSION PERMIT SYSTEMS 
 
”Private markets are perfectly efficient only if there are no public goods, no externalities, no 
monopoly buyers or sellers, no increasing returns to scale, no information problems, no transaction 
costs, no taxes, no common property an no other ‘distortions’ between the costs paid by buyers and 
the benefits received by sellers.” 
 
- Fullerton and Stavins (1998): How economists see the environment 
2.1 Foundations and basic concepts 
 
A tradable permit is a limited, transferable right issued by the government to perform an activity. In 
the context of GHG emissions, a permit gives its holder the right to emit a tonne of carbon dioxide 
(tCO2) or of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) depending on the trading scheme. The goal of the 
provisions is to guarantee cost-efficiency, since the marginal GHG emission abatement costs differ 
among sources. The cost efficiency argument of tradable permits stems from Coase (1960), who first 
suggested that a market might regulate harmful effects as effectively and efficiently as a state 
administration. In the context of environmental regulation, Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) were the 
first to consider tradable “pollution rights”. Montgomery (1972) showed that -- with certain 
assumptions -- a system of tradable pollution “licenses” will ensure that environmental quality 
standards are met at least total cost. 
 
The first significant tradable emission permit scheme, the emissions trading policy of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the United States, began gradually in 1974. The first 
phase was “netting”, which allowed companies internal trading. In 1977 trading was allowed with 
external counterparties as well, through “offsets” (EPA, 1977; Tietenberg, 1985). Since the 1970s, 
tradable permit systems have been used in many environmental or resource problems ranging from 
air pollution5, fisheries, water management, waste management and land use. However, tradable 
emission permit systems did not come into a wide-scale use until the 1990s’. In the UNFCCC, they 
were incorporated from the very beginning in the Article 4.2.(a, d). 
 
Current emissions trading systems can be classified to three6 categories: cap-and-trade -systems; 
baseline-and-credit (or project-based) trading (EPA, 2003; Janssen, 2001); and rate-based trading 
(EPA, 2003). In a cap-and-trade system, an aggregate emission cap is first defined for a group of 
polluters. Second, emission allowances are distributed to the group in an initial allocation. The initial 
allocation can be based on an auction or it can be a free of charge allocation, where the regulator 
determines the number of free allowances for each group member based on some criteria. These 
                                                                
5 see Harrison (1999) for a review on early air pollution related programs. 
6 “Bubbles”, which allow entities with multiple emissions sources to combine their total emissions 
targets from these multiple sources under one accounting entity, are often mentioned as emissions 
trading programs (e.g. IETA, 2004). However, bubbles do not necessarily allow any explicit trading.  
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criteria can range from grandfathering (based on historical emissions) to benchmarking (e.g. PWC, 
2003). The year of reference can be fixed or it can be updated (e.g. Harrison and Radov, 2002). 
Allocation could also be output-based (Fischer, 2001; Lashof et al. 1997). In a closed emissions 
trading system there is a single regulatory agency to issue the allowances, whereas in an open 
emissions trading system the regulator assigns only a fraction of the total amount of allowances and 
considers only the welfare effects in one’s jurisdiction (Böhringer and Lange, 2004). Next, members 
of the group can trade the allowances during the trading period. After the trading period, the regulator 
must control – possibly through an independent verifier - that the amount of allowances each group 
member has is equal to his monitored emissions. If this is not the case, a penalty may be charged. 
The “Acid Rain Program” in the United States, which set a national cap on sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
emissions from the beginning of 1995; the Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol; and the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which began in January 2005, are the most prominent 
examples of cap-and-trade systems. 
 
In baseline-and-credit trading, the unit of trade is an emission reduction; also called a credit7 or an 
offset (EPA, 1977). An emission reduction is generated, when an identifiable project reduces 
emissions compared to a predetermined reference scenario, the baseline. An independent third party 
may be requested to validate or determine that the baseline emissions have been determined in 
accordance with some commonly accepted baseline methodology. During the lifetime of the project, 
the operation of the project must be monitored so that the emission reduction can be calculated. The 
results can again be proved in a verification procedure. The most prominent examples of baseline-
and-credit trading are Article 6 (Joint Implementation, JI) and Article 12 (Clean Development 
Mechanism, CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. The Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Union linking 
these mechanisms to the EU ETS entered into force in November 2004. 
 
A rate-based trading refers to an approach in which the regulating authority determines an emission 
rate performance standard (i.e., an amount of emissions allowed per unit of heat input or product 
output) for a sector (e.g., tons/kWh) and allows sources that over- and under-comply with the 
standard to trade credits (EPA, 2003). Corporate Average Fleet Efficiency (or CAFE) standards in 
the US are an example of this kind of a system: the CAFE standards allow car manufactures to 
make changes within their own fleet of vehicles to ensure an overall average improvement in gas 
mileage per vehicle sold (IETA, 2004). 
2.2 Main research problems 
 
Research problems originated by tradable emission permit systems could be classified into four 
categories (1) the policy instrument selection problem; (2) trading scheme selection problem; (3) 
trading scheme design problems; and (4) trading scheme implication problems. 
 
Policy instrument selection problem: The first major question has been the performance of tradable 
permit systems as an environmental policy tool relative to other policy instruments, such as 
command-and-control and taxes. The main finding of Dales (1968, p. 801-802) was that an across-
the-board charging scheme is “clearly the best” way to achieve a specified policy target, and a 
system of tradable permits “reduces administrative costs by relieving administrators of the necessity 
of setting the charge for rights and changing it periodically to reflect economic growth or decline”. 
Baumol and Oates (1971) found that a fixed emission standard in a society, which produces a given 
output quantity with minimal costs, requires that marginal production and abatement costs are equal 
in all firms. This condition is fulfilled in an ideal decentralized market economy, if there is a uniform 
per-unit tax on emissions, i.e. a Pigouvian tax. The result implies that an emissions trading system 
                                                                
7 This term was already used in association with “netting” in the US emissions trading policy in 1974 
(Hahn 1989). 
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may give the same result as an optimal tax set by the government to reach the standard, but only 
under the assumption of perfect knowledge. Weitzman (1974) established the conditions under which 
the expected welfare gain under a unit tax exceeds or falls short of that of a tradable permit system, 
in the case that the abatement costs are uncertain (for the regulator): if the marginal environmental 
benefit curve is steeper than the marginal abatement cost curve, then the regulator should use 
tradable permits, and vice versa. The analysis of Weitzman (1974) has later on been completed with, 
e.g., adding uncertainty of the marginal abatement costs in companies (Adar and Griffin, 1976); 
nonlinear instead of linear functions and multiplicative instead of additive error terms (Watson and 
Ridker, 1984); correlated uncertainty in functions (Stavins, 1996); incomplete enforcement (Montero, 
2002); nonlinear or adjustable tax rates (Kaplow and Shawell, 2002); the stock of the pollutant and 
policy stringency (Hoel and Karp, 2002; Newell and Pizer, 2003). 
 
In the control of GHG emissions, recent studies suggest that taxes dominate tradable permits as long 
as the benefit function is rather flat (Baldursson and von der Fehr, 2004; Hoel and Karp, 2002; IPCC, 
2001; Newell and Pizer, 2003). Babiker et al (2004) argue that international emissions trading can 
also be welfare-decreasing due to negative terms of trade and tax effects. 
 
On the other hand, theoretically appealing Pigouvian taxes have not been broadly introduced in 
practice. Several reasons have been suggested in literature, including: (1) economic actors’ 
resistance of new taxes due to efficiency and competitiveness considerations (Pearce and Turner 
1990, p. 96-98; Vehmas et al. 1999); (2) lack of knowledge of the optimal tax level (Cropper and 
Oates, 1992; Pearce and Turner 1990, p. 96-98); (3) the need to preserve the status quo in society 
(Pearce and Turner 1990, p. 96-98); (4) the unwillingness to transfer capital from the private sector to 
the government (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002; Springer, 2003); and (5) a regulatory gap between 
economists who know theoretical virtues of Pigouvian taxes and administratives who are aware of 
practical difficulties in the legislation and implementation phase (Määttä, 1997, p. 15). All these 
except (4) apply to emissions trading (with free allocation) as well. Buchanan and Tullock (1975) have 
argued that firms will prefer emission standards to taxes because standards serve as a barrier to 
entry for new firms, thus raising company profits. 
 
Deficiencies of both systems invoked an early interest in hybrid approaches, where emitters can trade 
permits with other emitters or buy them from the government with a trigger price (Roberts and 
Spence, 1976). Such an “escape hatch” or a “safety valve” has attracted also recent interest (Jacoby 
and Ellerman, 2004; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002, 2004; Pizer 2002). 
 
Trading scheme selection problem: the relative performance of different kinds of tradable permit 
systems has also aroused interest. It has been found that a baseline-and-credit system (in 
comparison to a cap-and-trade system) requires less regulatory effort in the beginning and is thus 
suitable for situations where institutional capacity is limited (OECD, 1999). As each project has to be 
evaluated separately, however, the running costs of the system are higher. Overall, the transaction 
costs of cap-and-trade systems are considered lower than those of baseline-and-credit trading 
(Tietenberg 1992, Tietenberg et al. 1999, EPA, 2003), although this might be case-dependent 
(Woerdman, 2001). 
 
Trading scheme design problems: Noll (1982) identified four major design problems related to 
tradable emission permit systems: (1) liquidity of the market; (2) market concentration and 
competition; (3) sensitivity of the environmental quality to the geographic dimension of emissions and 
(4) the amount of flexibility the regulator has to alter the total amount of emissions. The third point is 
obviously not relevant in the context of carbon dioxide emissions, as they are uniformly mixed. The 
regulator has design features to attack the problems above: permit life, market definition, market 
initialization (i.e. the initial allocation) and provisions for market operation (Noll, 1982). 
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Since Dales (1968) it has been suggested that the regulators could have different vintages of permits: 
some perpetual, some of longer and some of short-term duration. More risk-averse firms could then 
sell short-term allowances and buy long-term allowances (Noll, 1982). Tietenberg (1985) argued that 
the vintage should depend on the type of pollutant. In the context of the EU ETS, for example, the 
idea of using different vintages has materialized: there are Allowances, Emission Reduction Units 
(ERUs) and Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), which all have different vintages. 
 
Noll (1982) noted “trades in thin markets usually have high transaction costs and produce noisy price 
signals. This can prevent markets from being substantially more efficient than a system of source-
specific standards”. Transaction costs may lead to a significant exaggeration of cost-competitiveness  
of emissions trading (Stavins, 1995). Transaction cost source categories for market participants can 
be summarized as (1) search and information; (2) bargaining and decision; (3) monitoring and 
enforcement; (4) costs of regulatory delay and (5) indirect costs associated with uncertainty of 
completing a trade (Stavins, 1996). In addition, there are political transaction costs outside the group 
of market participants (Betz, 2003). 
 
Recently, a lot of attention has been paid to transaction costs particularly in the case of baseline-and-
credit systems, such as JI and the CDM (e.g. Fichtner et al. 2003; Krey, 2005; Michaelowa and Jotzo, 
2005). It has been found that transaction costs in these mechanisms do not strongly depend on 
project size (e.g. Fichtner et al. 2003; Krey, 2005). The current experience suggests transaction costs 
ranging from USD 60,000 to USD 480,000 without monitoring and verification for large-scale projects 
(Krey, 2005; PCF 2003) or around 15% of the total procurement costs (without the costs of learning) 
in JI/CDM (MTI, 2005, p. 21). 
 
Another problem in the market definition in terms of greenhouse gases is the question whether the 
trading scheme should be targeted for upstream sources (e.g. fuel suppliers) or downstream sources 
(e.g. utilities) (e.g. Dudek and Tietenberg, 1992; Mohr, 1992). In practice, most current GHG 
emissions trading schemes tend to rely on downstream schemes. 
 
After the interest in tradable permit systems in the 70s’, the initial allocation methods of cap-and-trade 
systems became a natural research topic (e.g. Eheart et al. 1980). Dales (1968) originally thought 
that the government would “issue x pollution rights and put them up for sale”. From the very first 
emissions trading schemes (EPA emissions trading policy, Fox River, Lead trading, Dillon Reservoir), 
to the current systems the majority of emission allowances have, in reality, been given to companies 
free of charge (Hahn, 1989; Hasselknippe, 2003). Lyon (1982) studied different allocation systems 
with a simulation, and found a trade-off between decreasing the financial burden of rights purchases 
and removing the incentives for strategic behaviour. The effect of the initial allocation on market 
concentration was first considered in the research of Robert Hahn (e.g. Hahn 1984).  
 
Experience from the last few decades in the initial allocation methods is summarized in Harrison and 
Radov (2002). Examples on the recent work on initial allocation include Montero (1998) arguing that 
in the presence of transaction costs and uncertainty, the initial allocation may not be neutral in terms 
of efficiency. Montero (2000) studies the optimal allocation with the presence of a voluntary opt-in 
opportunity for non-affected firms. Burtraw et al. (2001) compare grandfathering, auction and output-
based allocation with a detailed electricity market model, and find the auction to have the lowest 
societal cost. Liski (2001) stresses the importance of the initial allocation on the transaction costs in a 
cap-and-trade scheme with a model, where trading costs develop endogenously as a function of the 
market size. Baron and Bygrave (2002) consider linking of emissions trading schemes with different 
allocation methods, and find little evidence suggesting major problems. Böhringer and Lange (2004) 
show that an optimal free allocation of allowances (including updating) depends on whether the 
emissions trading system is open or closed. Bode (2005) analyzes different allocation options 
(including updating) in multi-period emissions trading, and finds that utilities should have different 
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preferences depending on the fuel used. Articles 2 and 3 of this thesis discuss the impacts of the 
initial allocation method (grandfathering vs. auction) on the risk of a capital investor. 
 
In baseline-and-credit systems, the concept of baseline emissions is closely linked to the requirement 
of additionality of emission reductions as stated e.g. by Articles 6.1.(b) and 12.5 (c) of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The determination of additionality and the baseline are critical to the environmental 
objectives of a baseline-and-credit system. Discussion on the practical implementation of these 
concepts began during the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) pilot phase of the UNFCCC (e.g. 
Carter, 1997; IEA, 1997; Jepma, 1995; Michaelowa, 1998; Rentz, 1998), though the concept had 
already been in use in demand-side management projects in the US; in control of ozone depleting 
substances; and in the Global Enviroment Facilitity (GEF) (Sugiyama and Michaelowa, 1999). After 
the Kyoto Protocol, specific “additionality tests” ranging from financial assessments to market barrier 
analyses, and to examination of planning documents have been developed and discussed (Bode and 
Michaelowa 2003; Greiner and Michaelowa, 2003; PROBASE, 2003). Different insights and opinions 
were consolidated into a voluntary tool for the demonstration and assessment of additionality in 
December 2004 (CDM EB, 2004). 
 
Baseline approaches have been an intensive research area during the last decade (see e.g. Chomitz, 
1998; Ellis and Bosi, 1999; Ellis et al., 2001; Gustavsson et al., 2000; Kartha et al., 2004; Lazarus et 
al., 2001; OECD/IEA, 2000; PROBASE, 2003). A central question has been whether to use project-
specific, multi-project or hybrid baselines (Ellis and Bosi, 1999; Ellis et al., 2001; OECD/IEA, 2000), 
and how to put multi-project baselines into practice (BASE 2003; Ellis et al., 2001; Hargrave et al., 
1998; Kartha et al., 2004; PROBASE, 2003; Sathaye et al. 2004). Other problems have been 
baseline dynamics (i.e. should the baseline be deterministic, or to some extent dynamic or revisable) 
and data aggregation in multi-project baselines (e.g. Baumert, 1999; Gustavsson et al., 2000; 
Lazarus et al., 2001). There has also been discussion on whether baselines should be expressed in 
absolute (in tCO2e) or relative terms (in tCO2e per unit of production e.g. kWh), and what kind of 
implications this might have for different stakeholders (e.g. Baumert, 1999; Ellis et al., 2001; Janssen, 
2001; Willems, 2000). Article 5 of this thesis contributed to the last point focusing specifically on 
accuracy of emission reductions and manageability of GHG emission balances. Quantity risk 
implications of different baseline methodologies are also discussed in Article 6. 
 
Other research problems in trading scheme design, which are not discussed here are e.g. banking 
(e.g. Rubin and Kling, 1993; Rubin, 1996); borrowing (Rubin, 1996); links to other trading schemes 
(e.g. Baron and Bygrave, 2002; Bygrave and Bosi, 2004); and mechanisms for monitoring and non-
compliance (e.g. Tietenberg, 1985; Dudek and Tietenberg, 1992; Zhang, 1999). 
 
Trading scheme implication problems: numerous stakeholders of tradable permit systems are 
interested in the implications of a particular trading scheme. The focus of the implications studied can 
differ widely, for example: financial (e.g. Janssen, 2001; Rong and Lahdelma, 2005); economic (e.g. 
Peterson and Klepper 2004); technological (e.g. Barreto and Kypreos, 2004); environmental (e.g. van 
Vuuren et al. 2005); and social (e.g. de Motta 2004). The amount of literature in this area is enormous 
due to the preparation to the recent wide-scale use of trading schemes. Articles 1 to 4 and 6 of this 
thesis mainly belong to this category and focus on financial aspects. 
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3. IMPACTS ON INVESTMENTS IN HEAT AND POWER GENERATION 
 
”Over half the respondents felt that emissions trading would have a ‘significant impact’ on the fuel 
mix of future power generation.” 
 
- Ernst & Young survey of 200+ of the largest European companies involved 
with the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, June 2004 
 
3.1 Investment decision process 
 
Real investment decisions are often strategic due to the substantial amount of capital involved. The 
shift towards decentralization and profit maximization in power systems is likely to incur a higher 
degree of strategic decision-making (Botterud 2003, p. 17; Hobbs, 1995). Strategic decisions of 
individual companies result from processes which are affected by environmental, organizational and 
decision-specific factors (Rajagopalan et al. 1993). Decision processes involving evaluation of capital 
expenditure typically consist of at least four steps: (1) Identification of spending proposals; (2) 
Quantitative analysis of the incremental cash flows; (3) Qualitative issues which cannot be fitted into 
the cash flows calculus; and (4) Making the decision (Shank, 1996). When companies consider 
capacity expansion, they can have a make-or-buy decision i.e. an acquisition may be an alternative to 
a construction project (e.g. Yan, 2001). Article I of this thesis discusses the impacts of climate policy 
instruments, such as tradable emission permits, on the investment decision process. 
 
Research on investment decision processes can be either descriptive or prescriptive8 (Clemen and 
Reilly, 2001, p. 4). This thesis is definitely on the prescriptive side, and focuses on the quantitative 
investment appraisal. Botterud (2003, p. 19) notes that decision support models for investment 
decision processes can equally be either prescriptive or descriptive. Prescriptive models are based 
on optimisation, and the main purpose is to find the optimal investment strategy. The purpose of 
descriptive models is to increase a decision maker’s knowledge through simulation of the future 
system development under a set of different assumptions. All articles of this thesis apply descriptive 
models. 
 
Different analytical tools are deployed for different levels of uncertainty: when uncertainty increases, 
managers tend to prefer more qualitative tools (Alessandri et al., 2004; Courtney et al., 1997). 
Empirical studies show that uncertainty tends to dominate to risk9 in decision-making (Alessandri et 
al. 2004; March and Shapira, 1987). This is in line with Myers (2001) who states that finance theory 
has had “scant impact on strategic planning”, although “strategic planning needs finance”. He offers 
three more specific explanations to this “gap”: (1) finance theory and traditional approaches to 
strategic planning may be kept apart by differences in language and “culture”; (2) discounted cash 
flow analysis may have been misused, and consequently not accepted in strategic applications; and 
(3) discounted cash flow analysis may fail in strategic applications even if it is properly applied. In 
particular, there is a bias against long-term projects (Myers, 2001). Below, the last two points are 
elaborated in more detail. 
                                                                
8 Prescriptive research is interested in helping people make better decisions, whereas descriptive 
research focuses on how people actually make decisions (Clemen and Reilly, 2001, p. 15). 
9 Uncertainty and risk are often differentiated in capital budgeting: while risk refers to a consequence 
and a probability for the consequence, uncertainty refers to a situation where the decision-maker is 
unable to assign probabilities to consequences (e.g. Alessandri et al. 2004; Knight, 1921; March and 
Simon, 1958) 
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3.2 Theories and tools for quantitative investment appraisal in heat and power generation 
 
The theory of quantitative investment appraisal is based on some groundbreaking results in the 20th 
century. Fisher (1907) was the first to explicitly propose that the value of an asset can be estimated 
by discounting its future cash flows with an appropriate rate. There is thus a “time value of money”, 
which says that the same amount of money is worth more today than it is tomorrow. However, Fisher 
(1907) did not develop a methodology for the selection of ‘an appropriate rate’. Markowitz (1952) 
proposed to measure the risk of a security by the variance of its returns, and presented a rule how 
investors would strike a balance between risk and return, when they choose assets in a portfolio. 
With that rule, investors can form efficient portfolios, which either maximize the return for a given level 
of risk or minimize the risk needed for a given level of return. A seminal paper by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) stated the irrelevance of capital structure in investment decisions. Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965) introduced the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which suggests that in a market 
equilibrium, the expected risk premium on stock depends only on the risk premium of a market 
portfolio and beta, the covariance of the stock return with the market portfolio divided by the variance 
of the market portfolio. 
 
Standard techniques of quantitative investment appraisal in business today are the payback time 
method, the internal rate of return (IRR) and the Net Present Value (NPV) rule (e.g. Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Sandahl and Sjögren, 2003). There is some evidence that this is the case also in heat 
and power generation (Laurikka and Pirilä, 2005; Sandoff, 2003). The relevance and adequacy of 
these techniques have been questioned in the so-called “new view of investment” or “real option(s) 
valuation” (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Schwartz and Trigeorgis, 2001; Trigeorgis, 1995, for 
review). The central argument is that the standard techniques fail to capture management’s 
flexibility10 to adapt and revise later its decisions in response to market development. This failure 
results from the fact that investments are seldom “now-or-never” opportunities and they often are at 
least partly irreversible. 
 
The modern theory of investment starting from McDonald and Siegel (1985) and Brennan and 
Schwartz (1985) has extended the revolutionary discoveries of Black and Scholes (1972) and Merton 
(1973) on financial option pricing to valuation of real investments. Black and Scholes (1972) derived 
their famous formula based on several assumptions, the most important of which are: (1) an 
opportunity to set up a continuously hedged position in the derivative and the stock that is riskless i.e. 
has the same payoff in all states of the world; (2) arbitrage-free markets, in which the price of this 
portfolio and the risk-free asset must be equal; and (3) log-normal distributions of possible stock 
prices at the end of any finite interval. When valuing a derivative dependent on a stock price, it is 
possible to assume that the world is risk neutral i.e. the utility functions of all investors are in the form 
U(x) =ax, where x is the wealth variable; a is constant; and no account for risk is made11. This implies 
that it is (technically) possible to assume that the expected rate of return on any asset is the risk-free 
rate. Thus, even though risk premiums exist for assets, their determination is unnecessary in valuing 
the option. 
 
When contingent claims analysis as above is applied on real investment opportunities, it is crucial to 
find an appropriate twin asset or a portfolio of traded securities that has the same risk character that 
the firm would own if the option was exercised. In that case the project cash flows are replicated, the 
                                                                
10 Ku (1995) differentiates between active flexibility referring to the ability to react to change (i.e. real 
options), and passive flexibility or robustness referring to a state of being, such as a resistance or an 
immunity to change. 
11 Most real investors tend to be risk averse as first suggested by Friedman and Savage (1948). 
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market is complete and it is possible to find unique real option values for each asset. This may often 
be tricky (e.g. Teisberg, 1995), and in practice heat and power generators operate in incomplete 
markets (Hsu, 1998; OECD/IEA, 2003, p. 45; Vehviläinen, 2004). In incomplete markets the values of 
investments depend on various factors, such as (1) the investor’s preference model; (2) available 
budget; (3) other assets affecting the portfolio risk; and (4) alternative investment opportunities 
(Gustafsson, 2004). The value of the real option must therefore be frequently estimated in a risk-
adjusted framework with either dynamic programming, simulation or by adjusting the drift of the 
stochastic processes applied in partial differential equations with the risk premium (Amram and 
Kulatilaka, 1999; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 124; Schwartz and Trigeorgis, 2001, p 3.; Teisberg, 
1995). Incompleteness of the input and output factor markets is also an implicit assumption of all 
Articles of this thesis. Articles 2 to 4 estimate the value of real options using dynamic discounted cash 
flow analysis (see Teisberg, 1995) i.e. simulation and, to some extent, dynamic programming. 
 
Real investments differ from financial investments due to competitive interaction: many investments 
are at least to some degree interlinked through industry demand and supply (Murto, 2003). The 
effects of competition can be approached mathematically e.g. with system dynamic models or multi-
agent modelling. In oligopolistic settings, a game theoretic approach is needed, which has 
implications for real options analysis as well (e.g. Murto, 2003; Keppo and Lu, 2003; Grenadier, 
2000). The Articles of this thesis do not explicitly take into account strategic interaction. Instead, 
companies considering investments are assumed to be price-takers. This implies that the investment 
is small compared to the total market size and cannot as such be easily replicated by the organization 
considering investment. However, some implicit assumptions on the relationship of aggregate 
investment behaviour and prevailing electricity and allowance market prices are made in Articles 2 to 
4. 
 
In a price-taker setting, understanding the behavior of market prices of input and output factors is 
often decisive in quantitative investment appraisals. The most relevant market prices for studying 
energy projects have been electricity and fuel prices. Modeling of electricity and other commodity 
spot prices can be distinguished into two categories: (1) statistical or econometric models, which aim 
at direct modeling of the stochastic processes that represent prices; and (2) fundamental or structural 
models, which build the price processes based on equilibrium models for the market in question 
(Vehviläinen, 2004). Literature concerning real options is mainly based on the application of statistical 
models. Vehviläinen (2004) argues that the special characteristics of electricity markets are better 
captured with fundamental models. On the other hand, their usefulness for long-term modeling may 
be questioned due to the forecasting problems of explanatory variables, such as investment and 
production capacity and determinants of demand (Pindyck, 1999). Articles 2 to 4 of the thesis 
combine features of statistical and fundamental approaches: the price processes are modeled 
directly, but results of fundamental models are used to model the relationship of the market price of 
electricity and the emission allowance price. The reason for this is the available additional information 
compared to a purely statistical approach. 
 
The most commonly used price model in applications of real option theory is the Geometric Brownian 
Motion (GBM) (which is characterized by a constant growth rate combined with a variance increasing 
in proportion to time12. As noted above, GBM is the price model underlying the seminal work of Black 
and Scholes (1973), and it has been used13 in papers dealing with energy sector as well (Cavus, 
2001; Hsu, 1998; Kumbaroglu et al., 2004; Murto, 2003; Nakamura et al., 2005; Teisberg, 1993, 
1994; Venetsanos et al. 2002). 
 
Several researchers have found that commodity spot prices in general cannot be adequately 
represented by GBM, since in an equilibrium setting, high prices increase supply and low prices 
                                                                
12 For an introduction to stochastic processes, see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
13 Either referring to the value of the project, or to the commodity price. 
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increase demand (e.g. Bhattacharya, 1978; Cortazar and Schwartz, 1994; Gibson and Schwartz, 
1990; Laughton and Jacoby, 1995; Lund, 1993; Sarkar, 2003; Schwartz, 1997). In contrast, Metcalf 
and Hasset (1995) argue that cumulative investment is generally unaffected by the use of mean 
reversion rather than GBM. Pindyck (1999) uses a long time series for oil, coal and gas prices, and 
confirms mean reversion, but argues that reversion is so slow that for purposes of making investment 
decisions, one could just as well treat the price as GBM. 
 
There are several differences between electricity and many other commodities, such as non-
storability, high volatility, non-existence of the usual cash-and-carry arbitrage, the high number and 
varying characteristics of generating technologies, “price spikes” due to constraints in transmission 
capacity; and seasonal patterns (e.g. Deng, 1999; Deng and Jiang, 2004; Koekebakker, 2001). A 
number of statistical models have been developed to reflect these features (for a review, see e.g. 
Deng and Jiang, 2004; Vehviläinen, 2004). Authors have typically found mean reversion also in 
electricity prices (e.g. Deng and Jiang, 2004; Simonsen, 2003; Weron and Przybyłowicz, 2000; White 
et al., 2000). The unit of analysis has typically been the behaviour of an hourly or a daily price. 
 
Articles 2 to 4 of this thesis take a conservative approach to real option valuation, applying a simple 
one-factor mean-reverting model, the logarithmic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process in modelling the 
relevant long-term commodity prices. The speed of mean reversion is a parameter in this process, 
which makes the approach more flexible than a simple GBM concerning different views about the 
process characteristics. In the case of electricity, the logarithmic OU process applies to the annual 
average price of electricity. The seasonal fluctuation in electricity prices is taken into account through 
a fixed function based on historical price data of several years. Articles 3 and 4 depart from strict OU 
processes and allow a lognormal price distribution, where the expected value and the variance are 
comparable to a logarithmic OU process. 
 
3.3 Implications of tradable emission permit systems on investment 
 
Tradable emission permits create additional regulatory uncertainty in the quantitative investment 
appraisal of a project. Effects of regulation (in general) on investment decisions of companies have 
been studied e.g. by Teisberg (1993, 1994), who analyzes a hypothetical investment in a power plant 
project taking into account the uncertainty about the regulatory outcome of a completed project. She 
finds that regulation may cause asymmetric uncertainty to the value of a project, which implies that a 
higher degree of uncertainty may decrease the value of an investment opportunity. Pindyck (1993) 
analyzes the impact of regulatory and technical uncertainties on an investment in a nuclear power 
plant. The regulatory uncertainty is understood as uncertainty in input prices (labor, land, and 
materials). Liski (1997) studies the interplay of economic instruments of environmental policy 
(including emissions trading) and companies’ long-run compliance strategies in a fully dynamic 
framework. Klingelhöfer (2004) provides a general approach to evaluating all kinds of investments 
within a tradable emission permit system using state pricing and production theory. 
 
Literature focusing specifically on implications of emissions trading schemes on investment in heat 
and power generation can be classified as: (1) literature focusing only on permit related cash flow and 
(2) literature focusing on total cashflow. The Articles of this thesis contribute to both research streams 
as discussed below. 
 
Early contribution in the first category is Edleson and Reinhardt (1995) who studied an investment 
problem related to trading in SO2 emission allowances in a coal power plant. The plant operator could 
either continue as before and buy the allowances needed; overcomply by installing a scrubber and 
sell allowances; or switch to low-sulphur coal. A real options analysis using a binomial tree for the 
allowance price was applied to solve the problem. Spangardt et al. (2003) apply a logarithmic 
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process to support make-or-buy decisions in the emissions market, and take into 
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account project risks of technical emissions reduction. Their model can provide an efficiency frontier 
from several different solutions with different profit and risk levels. De Jong and Oosterom (2004) 
apply a binomial model to a GHG emission reduction project, such as an efficiency improvement in 
an existing power plant. They assume that full-load hours of the power plant can be perfectly 
estimated. Kiriyama and Suzuki (2004) compare the value of an investment in nuclear power, wind 
power and photovoltaics in 2010 using a GBM for the value of a CO2 emission credit. They focus on 
determining when it is optimal to commit to investments in emissions reduction (through less-
emission intensive plants) taking into account the impact on the emissions stock, which is subject to 
scientific uncertainty. 
 
Risk management of climate change mitigation projects, such as energy projects, have been studied 
e.g. by Janssen (2001), Springer (2003) and Article 6 of this thesis. Their analysis and conclusions 
are based on an assumption that investment in GHG emission abatement is not equal to an equity 
investment in that project activity. There should thus be an external investor, who pays the additional 
costs due to GHG abatement and obtains the emission permits as the return: a “GHG investor”, such 
as a carbon fund. The risks identified and their management is therefore focused exclusively on direct 
emission permit related risks, such as the permit price, the permit quantity and the abatement cost 
risk. Practical long-term relevance of such an arrangement remains to be seen. For example, most 
JI/CDM projects have so far been implemented with Emission Reduction Purchase Agreements 
(ERPA) where the external party simply buys the emission permits generated (with a potential 
prepayment and related sanctions for the seller in the case of non-delivery). 
 
There is a growing, recent literature on the second category. Reinaud (2003) explores how 
investment decisions in the power sector may be modified with the introduction of CO2 emission 
allowances. She examines both short-term and long-term impacts through a simplified aggregate 
level analysis ignoring any plant specificities. The analysis on long-term impacts is based on levelised 
cost methodology, which does not necessarily take into account the value of real options. The results 
show that the level at which switching from coal to gas occurs is around €19/tCO2 on the average.  
De Leyva and Lekander (2003) discuss the impacts of the EU ETS on power producers in Europe, 
based on a bottom-up energy system model. Regional level analyses (in Finland) have been made 
e.g. by Electrowatt-Ekono (2002, 2003b). Articles 2 to 4 present regional level case studies on 
investments based on dynamic DCF analysis, which takes into account the value of selected real 
options involved (see Section 3.2). 
 
Dobbe et al. (2003) and Näsäkkälä and Fleten (2004a, 2004b) analyze investments in gas-fired 
power plants under uncertainty with the real options approach. Lambie (2002) makes a similar 
analysis on a coal-fired plant. These papers assume that power companies generate electricity with 
the explored power plants, if the spark spread, the difference between price of electricity and the fuel 
cost, denoted with S, exceeds “emission cost”, denoted with E, which is (technically14) assumed 
constant. Näsäkkälä and Fleten (2004a, 2004b) however differentiate with base-load and peak–load 
plants: the former are assumed to generate electricity irrespective of the market prices due to 
inflexibility in gas inflow, while the latter produce electricity if S > E. Lambie (2002) models the net 
returns (i.e. variable returns minus variable costs) with a GBM. Dobbe et al. (2003) model futures 
prices of gas end electricity with mean-reverting processes similarly to Deng et al. (2001), while 
Näsäkkälä and Fleten (2004a, 2004b) model the spark spread through a sum of short-term deviations 
following an OU process and equilibrium price following an arithmetic (since the spark spread can 
become negative) Brownian motion with drift. 
 
                                                                
14 Lambie (2002) notes however “while uncertainty was not attributed to the price of permits in this 
example it will exist and, as suggested earlier, should increase the value of the option to invest.” 
Dobbe et al. (2003) and Näsäkkälä and Fleten (2004a) give similar comments. 
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The Articles of this thesis extend this research to emissions trading i.e. Articles 1 to 4 explicitly deal 
with the uncertainty in the price of emission permits, the number of free allowances and the linkage 
between emission allowance and electricity spot prices. In addition there are some other differences 
with these. The information given by forward prices is not explicitly utilized, though this can be done 
with the models presented. Gas-fired power plants are (always) assumed to have a real option to 
alter operating scale i.e. there are either no take-or-pay contracts, or there is a liquid secondary gas 
market15. Second, Articles 2 to 4 model all relevant price processes so that the volatility in spot prices 
is either constant or bounded, which is a more conservative approach to valuation than an arithmetic 
Brownian motion with drift. As a terminological difference, Articles 1 to 4 treat the cost of emission 
allowances and operation and maintenance costs in the spark spread (electricity is produced in any 
regulatory framework, if S > 0). 
 
De Jong and Oosterom (2004) discuss combination of power, fuel and allowance price uncertainties 
in a very similar way to Article 2. They present a formula for an “Emission spark spread”, but do not 
explicitly discuss the relation of power and allowance prices or the role of initial allocation of 
allowances. They also come to the conclusion that “traditional investment analysis needs to be 
augmented with emission costs; the absolute level as well as its volatility”. 
 
Sarkis and Tamarkin (2004) apply real options analysis to value a photovoltaic investment. They 
model two kinds of uncertainty, the exercise price of the technology and the emission allowance 
price, with a two-variable binomial lattice. The stochastic cost of photovoltaic technology is compared 
to the deterministic cost of conventional electricity with a stochastic value for emission permits. 
Weber (2004) applies a backward induction approach similar to real option theory to model the value 
of power plants in a long-term perspective, with uncertain allowance and fuel prices. He notes that a 
real options approach is desirable, but in this context “complicated by the possibilities of fuel 
switching with endogenous output prices and simultaneous uncertainties on loads, fuel prices, 
technologies and policies….therefore, future electricity prices and investments have to be treated 
simultaneously, thinking of a transition toward (stochastic) long-term price equilibrium”. Weber’s 
(2004) approach differs from conventional applications of real options theory in that prices are treated 
as endogenous. Articles 2 to 4 of this thesis treat the price of electricity without emissions trading as 
exogenous, but derive the price increase due to emissions trading endogenously from the results of 
energy system models, to estimate the future price of electricity in the Nordic market (ECON, 2004; 
Electrowatt-Ekono, 2003a; Koljonen et al. 2004). Similarly to Weber (2004) and Sarkis and Tamarkin 
(2004), Article 2 considers two stochastic variables (price of electricity and allowance price). Articles 3 
and 4 both have 4-5 stochastic prices, which are dealt with simultaneously. 
 
Rong and Lahdelma (2005) study the impacts of CO2 emissions trading on the risk of expansion 
planning of combined heat and power generation. They model uncertainty through 20 scenarios that 
can be considered as a sample of the joint probability distribution of different stochastic parameters, 
such as the price of electricity, allowance price and heat demand. In each scenario, they solve a 
deterministic optimization model, which can take into account real options related to operation, such 
as the option to switch fuel. Allowance price is modeled using Brownian motion with a price range. 
The price of electricity is weakly correlated with heat demand and allowance price. The risk level is 
measured through the standard deviation of the profit. The approach to the measurement of risk is 
similar to Article 3 of this thesis. The optimization of the CHP plant operation is similar to Article 4 
though more detailed. Article 4 in addition considers the value of a sequential investment in a 
stochastic framework. 
 
Weidlich et al. (2004) explore implications of emissions trading through an agent-based model, in 
which different actors of the energy market are modeled independently as rational entities (i.e. 
agents). The model enables investigation of the interplay between different agents and market 
                                                                
15 In Finland, a secondary gas market has been functional since March 2001. 
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dynamics (e.g. learning). The results of real option based analyses of single agents making 
assumptions about the markets (Articles 1 to 4) and multi-agent based analyses making assumptions 
about the behavior of single agents are obviously interrelated. 
 
 
4. THESIS 
 
The thesis consists of six individual articles, which are briefly described in this section. The articles 
take different perspectives to the research question, focus on different tradable permit systems and 
consider diverse stochastic variables at varying level of quantification and detail (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Perspective and focus of the Articles.  
Article Perspective Tradable emission 
permit system 
Stochastic variables 
considered  
Article 1 Capital investor Cap-and-trade /  
Baseline-and-credit 
Several (qualitative) 
Article 2 Capital investor Cap-and-trade Price of electricity 
Price of emission allowance 
Article 3 Capital investor Cap-and-trade Price of electricity 
Price of emission allowance 
Price of gas 
Rainfall 
Wind speed 
Article 4 Capital investor Cap-and-trade Price of electricity 
Price of emission allowance 
Price of gas 
Price of heavy-fuel-oil 
Price of coal 
Price of biomass fuel 
Article 5 Regulator Baseline-and-credit Project output 
 
Article 6 Capital investor  
(exotic) 
Baseline-and-credit Credit quantity 
 
 
 
(1) The impact of climate policy on heat and power capacity investment decisions  
 
The economic lifetime of an investment in heat and power capacity typically ranges from 20-40 years. 
During the lifetime, different instruments of climate policy can influence the cash flows of the plant 
and thus its viability. Such instruments can range from problem-specific tradable emission permits to 
more general policy instruments, such as taxation and subsidies. 
 
Article 1 explores the mechanisms through which climate policy instruments affect heat and power 
capacity investment decisions through a literature survey. Both cap-and-trade and baseline-and-
credit emissions trading systems are therefore included. The perspective is that of a capital investor. 
First, the role of climate policy instruments in an investment decision process is analysed. The 
starting point is a framework of Rajagopalan et al. (1993) for strategic decisions, which is used to 
identify channels through which climate policy instruments change investment decisions. The 
decision process is split to four broad steps following Shank (1996): (1) Identification of spending 
proposals; (2) Quantitative analysis of the incremental cashflows; (3) Qualitative issues which cannot 
 15 
be fitted into the cash flows calculus; and (4) Making the decision. The way how thinking about 
decision-making in the context of heat and power generation has changed during the last few 
decades is briefly discussed. It is concluded that climate policy has significantly increased 
uncertainty, which results in a higher value for flexibility in its different forms. 
 
In the second part, a closer look is taken to the quantitative investment appraisal from the Net 
Present Value framework. The impact of climate policy instruments on the initial investment, on the 
annual cashflows and on the discount rate are analysed, taking into account the flexibility aspects, i.e. 
how flexibility can help to cope with the impacts. Flexibility characteristics of some existing heat and 
power generation technologies are discussed and compared with each other. 
 
Heat and power generation technologies show significant structural differences in flexibility to 
stochastic changes in climate policy instruments. Whereas some technologies provide active 
flexibility through options to alter operating scale and to switch between fuels or products, others 
provide passive flexibility (robustness). Active flexibility can be taken into account through the real 
option theory in the investment decision process. Robustness either creates upside potential in 
annual cashflows or provides insurance against the downside risk. 
 
The scientific contribution of Article 1 consists of its systematic treatment of climate policy in heat and 
power capacity investment decisions, in particular regarding flexibility. 
 
(2) Emissions trading and investment decisions in the power sector– a case study in Finland 
 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the most prominent example of a 
tradable emission permit system for greenhouse gas emissions. Implications of the EU ETS on the 
power sector investment broadly has been studied e.g. by Reinaud (2003) and de Leyva and 
Lekander (2003). 
 
Article 2 considers the impacts of the EU ETS in a more detailed regional setting in Finland paying 
more attention to flexibility. The impacts of a cap-and-trade system are examined from the 
perspective of a capital investor. First, a brief review on the general mechanisms through which 
emissions trading affects size, timing and cashflow of an investment decision is provided. Next, the 
regional investment environment of power producers in Finland is explored. Third, financial impacts of 
the EU ETS are examined in a hypothetical single-firm investment problem: a 250 MWe condensing 
power plant using either coal or natural gas. An exogenous, stochastic price model16 is applied in the 
case study in order to extend the standard discounted cashflow (DCF) analysis to better reflect the 
value of two real options involved: the option to wait and the option to alter operating scale. The value 
of options is estimated in a normal risk-adjusted framework through a dynamic DCF analysis. 
Similarly to Deng and Oren (2003), two stochastic variables are used to estimate the value of the real 
options: the price of electricity without the EU ETS, and the price of an emission allowance. 
 
The case study shows that a result of a quantitative investment appraisal for a gas-fired power plant 
highly depends on the assumptions made on emissions trading in a power market similar to that of 
Finland. The impact mainly depends on the assumed price level of emission allowances and the 
(potential) allocation of free allowances. However, behaviour of the allowance market (e.g. volatility 
and correlations to electricity and fuel prices) can have a significant impact on the expected return. 
The case study further shows that the high uncertainty regarding allocation of free allowances is 
critical to decisions to switch to natural gas. Renewable and nuclear energy remain unaffected by this 
particular uncertainty. 
 
                                                                
16 See Ventosa et al. (2005) for a taxonomy on electricity market models. 
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The scientific contribution of Article 2 is the comprehensive treatment of the impacts of the EU ETS in 
an investment decision involving real options in the power sector. It has been used as reference 
material in Rong and Lahdelma (2005). 
 
(3) A case study on risk and return implications of emissions trading in power generation 
investments  
 
Exposure of different types of power generation technologies to the risks of emissions trading differs. 
Whereas fossil-fuel-fired technologies are subject to a fuel price risk and emission allowance 
allocation risk and give real options, renewable energies are often subject to a production volume risk 
and possess robustness. 
 
Article 3 explores the quantitative implications of the EU ETS on risk and return of investments in 
three specific technologies: a combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT), an off-shore wind power farm and 
an existing hydro power plant with a reservoir. A single-firm exogenous and stochastic price 
simulation model is used to compare the performance of the technologies with the dynamic DCF 
analysis similar to that of Article 2. The simulation model of Article 3 can, however, deal with multiple 
uncertain variables. The perspective is that of a capital investor. 
 
First, literature on risk management in power generation investments is briefly reviewed. It is 
concluded that risk management is useful for companies, and hedging and portfolio diversification 
can be applied as risk management tools within an emissions trading scheme. This motivates the 
model to study the long-term return and the total risk (excluding technical and construction-related  
risks) involved, which is presented next. Finally, the data applied and the results obtained are 
presented and discussed. 
 
Article 3 shows that emissions trading increases the expected return of all three power plant 
technologies. The increase in risk is significant only for the CCGT: emissions trading can almost triple 
the total risk of the CCGT. Investment in an existing hydro power plant portrays as “high profit, low 
risk” investment. Such opportunities can obviously be expected to be rare in competitive markets and 
the prices are likely to adapt. CCGT seem to be “negative-to-low profit, high risk” investments, and 
off-shore wind power a “negative-to-low profit, low risk” investment. Off-shore wind power is viable 
only in good wind conditions with subsidies. Opportunities for portfolio diversification with the 
technologies studied are low. 
 
The scientific contribution of Article 3 is the model to compare long-term expected returns and the 
related risks taking into account selected real options. The model can be applied to a wide range of 
technologies and be extended to take into account other real options, such as the option to switch 
product and/or fuel. 
 
(4) Option value of gasification technology within an emissions trading scheme 
 
Real options are sometimes present both in the initial setting before the investment and in the setting 
after the investment. This is the case, for example, in many power plant retrofits, where it is 
necessary to take into account the change in the option value. Article 4 explores the impact of a cap-
and-trade emissions trading system, and in particular the EU ETS, on these kinds of investments. A 
similar methodology to that in Article 3 is applied in two actual case studies focusing on a specific 
technology. 
  
Solid fuel gasification technologies, such as Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) plants, 
are promising alternatives for future heat and power generation due to the high generating efficiency 
and favourable characteristics regarding potential carbon dioxide capture. First commercial 
applications are expected in oil refineries and coal power condensed power plants. The first case 
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study of Article 4 analyzes an investment in gasification of biomass in an existing coal-fired 
condensing power plant. The gasification plant would give the plant owner a valuable option to switch 
between fuels (coal and biomass). The second case study explores the value of an option to use 
gasification of coal in a new residential CHP plant based on a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT). 
During the construction of the CCGT, there is an opportunity for a preparatory initial investment, 
which represents a compound option to acquire later on (through a follow-up investment in IGCC) an 
option to switch fuel repeatedly depending on the market situation. 
 
The results show that a straightforward application of discounted cash flow analysis can lead to 
biased results in competitive energy markets within an emissions trading scheme, where a number of 
uncertainties potentially combined with several real options can make quantitative investment 
appraisals very complex. The IGCC technology does not yet seem competitive in power plant retrofits 
within the EU ETS. The current investment cost of IGCC technology is too high for viable retrofit 
investments. 
 
The scientific contribution of Article 4 is the model to estimate profitability and its risk (standard 
deviation) in power plant retrofits with multiple uncertainties and real options. The second case study 
estimates the value of a real compound option. The case studies also give insights to the conditions 
under which IGCC plants might become competitive in real applications. 
 
(5) Absolute or relative baselines for JI/CDM projects in the energy sector? 
 
The concept of “baseline emissions” is essential for a baseline-and-credit type emissions trading 
system. One problem related to standardisation of baselines for different kinds of investments, 
including the investments in heat and power capacity, has been whether to give the baseline scenario 
as an absolute (in tCO2 equivalent) or as a relative or rate-based (in tCO2 equivalent per unit of 
production, e.g. MWh) figure. The topic was brought up as one of the main questions in baseline 
standardisation, as it was thought it could have wide implications regarding the simplicity of baseline 
determination and the environmental performance of JI and the CDM (Ellis et al., 2001). In addition, 
the potential co-existence of both absolute and relative baselines was identified to have important 
implications on risk management of investments (Janssen, 2001). It was argued that both absolute 
and relative baselines create problems. 
 
Article 5 contributed to this discussion with an analysis on two project types: a heat and/or power 
generation project and an energy efficiency project. The criteria used in the analysis were accuracy of 
the GHG emission reduction, and manageability of a GHG emission balance. Hence, the perspective 
in Article 5 is that of a regulator. 
 
Article 5 shows that relative baselines are a more accurate instrument for the estimation of emission 
reductions in JI/CDM projects in the energy sector, without posing significant additional risks to the 
management of GHG emission balances for large entities, such as states or multinational companies. 
In comparison to absolute baselines, relative baselines indicate in a more realistic and conservative 
manner the amount of emission reductions obtained within the energy system, and give more 
appropriate incentives to project sponsors. The additional risks of relative baselines for the 
manageability of GHG emission balances are likely to be small, compared to the normal deviation of 
the domestic/internal GHG emissions. Companies with a critical mass and ability to absorb the risk of 
an activity deviation have the potential to sell constant reductions to risk-averse organisations with a 
corresponding risk premium. 
 
The scientific contribution of Article 5 consists of its systematic treatment of this specific design 
problem in baseline-and-credit trading systems in the energy sector. Since its publication, for 
example Bygrave and Bosi (2004), IDD (2003), Imai et al. (2005), Langniss and Praetorius (2005), 
Shipworth (2003) and Spalding-Fecher et al. (2002) have used Article 5 as reference material. 
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(6) Risk and return of project-based climate change mitigation: a portfolio approach 
 
International emission reduction commitments, such as the Kyoto Protocol, raise the interest to find 
locations and projects, where such emission reductions can be made at the lowest possible cost. 
However, looking at the cost alone, one easily ignores the fact that risks of alternatives often differ 
and should be taken into account in the analysis. 
 
Article 6 presents a framework for evaluating investment risks of project-based climate change 
mitigation. Two kinds of investments are first separated. In a conventional real investment, where the 
capital is given as equity or debt, the investor is keen to manage all the risks related to the capital 
jointly. As shown in Articles 1 to 4 above, such a comprehensive risk assessment involves a large 
number of critical variables. Article 6 studies a different contractual arrangement, where the owner of 
the plant could give the right to the emission permits generated in a project to another party, a “GHG 
investor”. 
  
The risks of a “GHG investor” can be categorised as price risks, cost risks and quantity risks. As price 
and cost risks are difficult to assess quantitatively, Article 6 focuses on the determinants of quantity 
risk and identifies environmental/technological, economic and social risk factors for six main project 
types. A methodology is presented to quantify risk and return of such GHG abatement investments, 
and illustrated using a sample of projects from the US Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases 
(VRGHG) Program. 
 
Since the risk factors differ between project types, it is concluded that diversification of investments is 
a promising risk reduction strategy. Carbon funds not only serve as vehicles to channelling 
investments, but also help to reduce investment risks. Project risks are high, but show no clear 
pattern across project types. Since market risks were not considered, the analysis was likely to 
understate the risks involved in project-based climate change mitigation. Political risks, such as the 
continuation of emission targets beyond 2012, affect all projects equally. Therefore, they cannot be 
diversified through investments in different projects. 
 
The main scientific contribution of Article 6 is the analysis of the envisaged contractual arrangement 
and the quantity risk. Since its publication, for example, Jensen (2003) and Michaelowa et al. (2004) 
have used Article 6 as reference material. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This thesis presents six separate articles on the impacts of tradable greenhouse gas emission 
permits on investments in heat and power generation. The articles contribute, on the one hand, to the 
research on emissions trading system design, and on the other hand, to the research and practical 
implications of emissions trading systems on investments in heat and power plants. Articles 1 to 4 
take the perspective of a capital investor. Article 1 gives an overview on the impacts of climate policy 
instruments, such as different emissions trading schemes, on investment in heat and power 
generation capacity. Articles 2 to 4 present case studies on a specific scheme, namely the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme. The impacts of emissions trading are evaluated with a dynamic 
discounted cash flow analysis taking into account selected real options involved. Article 3 discusses 
the implications on investment risk management. Article 5 explores a specific design problem from 
the perspective of a regulator in a baseline-and-credit scheme. Article 6 considers management of 
investment risks in baseline-and-credit schemes from the perspective of an exotic capital investor. 
 
The main contribution of the work undertaken is on the applied rather than the theoretical side of the 
research on this topic. The approach of the work has been prescriptive rather than descriptive. The 
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focus of the work has been on quantitative investment appraisal, rather than on identification of 
investment alternatives or treatment of their qualitative aspects. 
 
Emission permit markets have been and still are strongly developing, which has marked the research 
approach and research questions posed on the one hand, and the methods used to seek answers to 
the research questions on the other hand. For example, all articles of this thesis consider the 
investment decisions in a risk-adjusted framework due to the incompleteness of input and output 
markets, and regulatory uncertainty. It is possible that mature permit markets, together with financial 
innovation in the electricity and fuel markets, bring investment decisions in heat and power 
generation closer to a complete market setting, where derivative prices can be directly used to value 
assets -- at least for a medium term. Liquid derivative markets are in common interest, since they 
facilitate the flow of capital by transferring the financial risk to those who are most capable and willing 
to bear it. The emergence of such markets can be supported by public policy. 
 
Meanwhile, risk-adjusted methodologies, which take into account the different forms of flexibility 
provided by investment projects are needed both for individual investment decisions in heat and 
power generation; and for analyses of the energy systems in aggregate. The starting point of this 
thesis was that companies are price-takers, which is not always the case. Research on strategic 
interaction, game theory and agent-based modelling can provide valuable new insights to dynamic 
effects caused by emissions trading schemes in energy markets. 
 
 
 
REFERENCES: 
 
Adar, Z., Griffin, J.M., 1976. Uncertainty and the choice of policy instruments. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 3 (3), 178-188 
 
Alessandri, T.M., Ford, D.N., Lander, D.M., Leggio, K.B., Taylor, M., 2004. Managing risk and 
uncertainty in complex capital projects. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 44, 
751-767 
 
Amram, M., Kulatilaka, N., 1999. Real options – managing strategic investment in an uncertain world. 
Harvard Business School Press. Boston, Massachusetts. 
 
Babiker, M., Reilly, J., Viguier, L., 2004. Is international emissions trading always beneficial? The 
Energy Journal, Vol. 25, Issue 22, 33-56 
 
Baldursson, F.M., von der Fehr, N.H.M., 2004. Price volatility and risk exposure: on market-based 
environmental policy instruments. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 48 (1), 682-
704 
 
Baron, R., Bygrave, S., 2002. Towards international emissions trading: design implications for 
linkages. OECD/IEA . Paris. 
 
Barreto, L., Kypreos, S., 2004. Emissions trading and technology deployment in an energy-systems 
“bottom-up” model with technology learning. European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 158, 
Issue 1, 243-261 
 
BASE (Baselines for Accession States in Europe), 2003. Final Publishable Report. European 
Commission. Contract Number: ENK6-CT2001-00582. 
 
 20 
Baumert, K., 1999. Understanding additionality. In: Goldemberg, J., Reid, W. (eds) Promoting 
development while limiting greenhouse gas emissions – trends and baselines. United Nations 
Development Programme, World Resources Institute, New York. 
 
Baumol, W.J., Oates, W.E., 1971. The Use of Standards and Prices for Environmental Protection, 
Swedish Journal of Economics 73, 42 - 54 
 
Betz, R., 2003. Emissionshandel zur Bekämpfung des Treibhauseffektes – Der Einfluss der 
Ausgestaltung auf die Transaktionskosten am Beispiel Deutschland, Fraunhofer IRB Verlag, 
Speyer/Karlsruhe (In German) 
 
Bhattacharya, S., 1978. Project valuation with mean-reverting cash flows. Journal of Finance 33 (5), 
1317-1331 
 
Bingham, M.H., Kiesel, R. 2004. Risk-Neutral Valuation – Pricing and Hedging of Financial 
Derivatives. Second Edition. Springer-Verlag. 
 
Black, F., Scholes, M., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political 
Economy 81 (3), 637-654 
 
Bode, S., 2005. Multi-period emissions trading in the electricity sector – winners and losers. Energy 
Policy (In press) 
 
Bode, S., Michaelowa, A., 2003. Avoiding perverse effects of baseline and investment additionality 
determination in the case of renewable energy projects. Energy Policy, Vol. 31 (6), 505-517 
 
Botterud, A. 2003 Long-Term Planning in Restructured Power Systems – Dynamic modelling of 
Investments in New Power Generation under Uncertainty. PhD thesis. The Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology (NTNU). Department of Electrical Power Engineering. 
 
Brennan, M., Schwartz, E. S., Evaluating natural resource investments. Journal of Business 58 (2), 
135-157 
 
Buchanan, J.M., Tullock, G., 1975. Polluter’s profits and political response: direct controls versus 
taxes. The American Economic Review 65 (1), 139-147 
 
Bullinger, C.D., Shetty, A.A., 2004. Power Investing: How to Invest in the Electricity Industry. The 
Electricity Journal. August/September, 55-64 
 
Burtraw, D., Palmer, K., Bharvirkar, R., Paul, A., 2001. The effect of allowance allocation on the cost 
of carbon emission trading. Discussion Paper 01-30. Resources for the Future. 
 
Bygrave, S., Bosi, M., 2004. Linking project-based mechanisms with domestic greenhouse gas 
emissions trading schemes. OECD and IEA information paper for the Annex I Expert Group on the 
UNFCCC. Paris. 
 
Böhringer, C., Lange, A., 2004. On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission 
allowances. European Economic Review. 
 
Carter, L., 1997. Modalities for the Operationalization of Additionality, prepared for presentation at 
UNEP/German Federal Ministry of Environment workshop on AIJ (Leipzig, March 1997) 
 
 21 
Cavus, M., 2001. Valuing a power plant under uncertainty. In: Howell, S., Stark, A., Newton, D., 
Paxson, D., Cavus, M., Pereira, J., Patel, K., 2001. Real options – Evaluating corporate investment 
opportunities in  a dynamic world. Prentice-Hall,  p. 113-138 
 
CDM EB (The Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board), 2004. Tool for the demonstration 
and assessment of additionality. Annex 1 to the 16th meeting of the Executive Board. 
 
Chomitz, K., 1998. Baselines for greenhouse gas reductions: problems, precedents, solutions. 
Carbon offsets unit, World Bank. 
 
Clemen, R.T., Reilly, T., 2001. Making hard decisions with DecisionTools©. Duxbury. Pacific Grove, 
CA. 
 
Coase, R. H., 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics III (Oct), 1-44 
 
Cortazar, G., Schwartz, E.S., 1994. The evaluation of commodity contingent claims. Journal of 
Derivatives 1, 27-39 
 
Courtney, H., Kirkland, J., Vigueria, P., 1997. Strategy under uncertainty. Harvard Business Review, 
75(6), 66-79 
 
Crocker, T. D., 1966. The structuring of atmospheric pollution control systems. In Wolozin, H. (ed) 
The Economics of Air Pollution. Norton, New York. 
 
Cropper, M.L., Oates, W.E., 1992. Environmental economics: a survey. Journal of Economic 
Literature 30 (2), 675-740 
 
Dales, J. H., 1968. Land, water and ownership. Canadian journal of economics, Vol. 1, No 4, 791-804 
 
De Jong, C., Oosterom, A., 2004. Investing in emissions: a real options approach. Working paper,  
August. Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
 
De Motta, R.S.,  2002. Social and Economic aspects of CDM options in Brazil. International Journal 
of Global Environment Issues 2 (3-4), 310-321 
 
Deng, S., 1999. Stochastic models of energy commodity prices and their applications: mean-
reversion with jumps and spikes. Working paper, University of California, Berkeley. 
 
Deng., S., Johnson, B., Sogomonian, A., 2001. Exotic electricity options and the valuation of 
electricity generation and transmission assets. Decision Support Systems 30, 383-392 
 
Deng, S., Oren, S.S., 2003. Incorporating operational characteristics and startup costs in option-
based valuation of power generation capacity. Probability in the Engineering and Informational 
Sciences 17 (2), 155-181  
 
Deng, S., Jiang, W., 2004. Levy process-driven mean-reverting electricity price model: the marginal 
distribution analysis. Decision Support Systems. In press. 
 
De Leyva, E., Lekander, P.A., 2003. Climate change for Europe’s utilities. The McKinsey Quarterly. 
New York. 
 
Dinica, V. 2005 Support systems for the diffusion of renewable energy technologies – an investor 
perspective. Forthcoming in Energy Policy. 
 22 
 
Dixit, A.K., Pindyck, R.S., 1994. Investment under uncertainty. Princeton University Press. Princeton. 
New Jersey. 
 
Dobbe T., Fleten S-E., Sigmo S., 2003. Valuing gas power plants with CO2 capture and tradable 
quotas, Proceedings 16th International Conference on Efficiency, Costs, Optimization, Simulation and 
Environmental Impact of Energy Systems, June 30 – July 2, Denmark. 
 
Dudek, D., Tietenberg, T., 1992. Monitoring and enforcing greenhouse gas trading. In: OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 1992. Climate change: designing a 
tradeable permit system. Paris. 
 
ECON, 2004. Emissions trading and power prices. ECON report 2004-020. Project No 42100. 
 
EDC (Energy for Development Conference), 2004. Chairman’s conclusions. December 12 – 14. 
Noordwijk. 
 
Edleson, M. E., Reinhardt, F. L., 1995. Investment in Pollution Compliance Options: the Case of 
Georgia Power. In: Trigeorgis, L. (ed.) Real options in capital investment – models, strategies and 
applications. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut. 
 
Eheart, J.W., Joeres, E.F., David, M.H., 1980. Distribution Methods for Transferable Discharge 
Permits. Water Resources Research 16, 833-843 
 
Electrowatt-Ekono, 2002. Päästökaupan vaikutuksia energiasektoriin. Raportti 60K03063-Q060-
004A. 
 
Electrowatt-Ekono, 2003a. Emissions trading and the Nordic electricity market. Report 60K04063-
Q070-004. 
 
Electrowatt-Ekono, 2003b. Laskentatulosten päivityksiä selvitykseen “päästökaupan vaikutuksia 
energiasektoriin”. Raportti 60K4590.02-Q210-002A. 
 
Ellis, J., Bosi, M., 1999. Options for project emission baselines. OECD/IEA information paper. Paris. 
 
Ellis, J., Missfeldt, F., Bosi, M., Painuly, J., 2001. Possibilities for standardised baselines for JI and 
the CDM. In: Proceedings of the Chairman’s recommendations and workshop report for the 
UNEP/OECD/IEA Workshop on Baseline Methodologies, 7-9 May, Roskilde, Denmark. 
 
EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), 1977. Amendments to the Clean Air Act. 
 
US EPA (United States Environmental Protection Agency), 2003. Tools of the trade – a guide to 
designing and operating a cap and trade program for pollution control. EPA430-B-03-002. 
 
Fichtner, W., Graehl, S., Rentz, O., 2003. The impact of private investor’s transaction costs on the 
cost effectiveness of project-based mechanisms. Climate Policy 3 (3), 189-235 
 
Fisher, I., 1907. The Rate of Interest. New York. 
 
Fischer, C., 2001. Rebating environmental policy revenues: output-based allocations and tradable 
performance standards. Discussion paper 01-22. Resources for the Future. 
 
 23 
Friedman, M., Savage, L.J., 1948. The utility analysis of choices involving risk. The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 56, Issue 4, 279-304 
 
Fullerton, D., Stavins, R., 1998. How economists see the environment. Nature, Vol 395 (6701), 433-
434. 
 
Gibson, R., Schwartz, E.S., 1990. Stochastic convenience yield and the pricing of oil contingent 
claims. Journal of Finance 45 (3), 959-976 
 
Graham, J.R., Harvey, C.R., 2001. The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the 
field. Journal of Financial Economics 60 (2-3), 187-243 
 
GreenStream Network, 2005. EU Allowance market database. 
 
Greiner, S., Michaelowa, A., 2003. Defining investment additionality for CDM projects – practical 
approaches. Energy Policy, Vol. 31 (10), 1007-1015 
 
Grenadier, S., 2000. Game choices: the intersection of real options and game theory. Risk Books. 
 
Gustafsson, J., 2004. Valuation of projects and real options in incomplete markets. Licentiate thesis. 
Department of Engineering Physics and Mathematics. Helsinki University of Technology. 
 
Gustafsson, L., Karjalainen, T., Marland, G., Savolainen, I., Schlamadinger, B., Apps, M., 2000. 
Project-based greenhouse gas accounting: guiding principles with a focus on baselines and 
additionality. Energy Policy 28, 935-946. 
 
Haas, R., Eichhammer, W., Huber, C., Langniss, O., Lorenzoni, A., Madlener, R., Menanteau, P., 
Morthorst, P.-E., Martins, A., Oniszk, A., Schleich, J., Smith, A., Vass, Z., Verbruggen, A. (2004) How 
to promote renewable energy systems successfully and effectively. Energy Policy 32, 833-839. 
 
Hahn, R. W., 1984. Market Power and Transferable Property Rights. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
99(4), 753-765. 
 
Hahn, R.W., 1989. Economic prescriptions for environmental problems: how the patient followed the 
doctor’s orders. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (2), 95-114 
 
Hargrave, T., Halme, N., Puhl, I., 1998. Options for simplifying baseline setting for Joint 
Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects. Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP). 
November. 
 
Harrison, D., 1999. Tradable permits for air pollution control: the US experience. In OECD, 1999: 
Implementing Domestic Tradable Permits for Environmental Protection, Paris. 
 
Harrison, D., Radov, D.B., 2002. Evaluation of alternative initial allocation mechanisms in a European 
Union greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading scheme. National Economic Research 
Associates with assistance from Jaakko Pöyry Consulting. Report for the DG Environment, European 
Commission. 
 
Hasselknippe, H., 2003. Systems for carbon trading: an overview. Climate Policy 3S2, S43-S57 
 
Hobbs, B.F., 1995. Optimization methods for electric utility resource planning. European Journal of 
Operational Research 83 (1), 1-20 
 
 24 
Hoel, M., Karp, L., 2002. Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant. Resource and Energy Economics 
24, 367-384 
 
Hsu, M., 1998. Spark spread options are hot! The Electricity Journal 11 (2), 28-39 
 
IDD (Institut pour un Developpément Durable), 2003. The Clean Development Mechanism: Designing 
the tools and implementation CP-26. Intermediary Report. Belgian Federal Science Policy Office. 
Brussels. 
 
IEA (International Energy Agency), 1997. Key Issues on the Design of Activities Implemented Jointly; 
Baseline Determination and Additionality Assessment. Paris. 
 
IEA (International Energy Agancy), 2003. World Energy Investment Outlook 2003. Paris. 
 
IEA (International Energy Agancy), 2004. World Energy Outlook 2004. Paris. 
 
IETA (International Emissions Trading Association), 2004. www.ieta.org. 
 
Imai, H., Akita, J., Niizawa, H., 2005. On alternative CDM baseline schemes and their 
appropriateness: ex-ante, ex-post, and ex-post proxy baselines. Discussion Paper Nr. 083. 21COE. 
Interfaces for Advanced Economic Analysis. Kyoto University. 
 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2001. Climate change 2001. Mitigation. 
 
Jacoby, H.D., Ellerman, A.D., 2004. The safety valve and climate policy. Energy Policy 32 (4), 481-
491 
 
Janssen, J., 2001. Risk Management of Investments in Joint Implementation and Clean Development 
Mechanism Projects. Dissertation Nr. 2547 at the University of St. Gallen. Difo-Druck. Bamberg. 
 
Jensen, J., 2003. Priser og risici på internationale markeder for de fleksible mekanismer. Miljøprojekt 
Nr. 762 2003. Miljøstyrelsen. (In Danish) 
 
Jepma, C.(ed.), 1995.  The flexibility of joint implementation. Kluwer, Dordrecht. 
 
Jones, T., Morlot, J., 1992. Introduction. In: OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development), 1992. Climate change: designing a tradeable permit system. Paris. 
 
Kaplow, L., Shawell, S., 2002. On the superiority of corrective taxes to quantity regulation. American 
Law and Economics Review 4 (1), 1-17 
 
Kara, M., 2004. Päästökaupan vaikutus pohjoismaiseen sähkökauppaan – ehdotus Suomen 
strategiaksi. Selvitysmiehen loppuraportti kauppa- ja teollisuusministeriölle. (In Finnish) 
 
Kartha, S., Lazarus, M., Bosi, M., 2004. Baseline recommendations for greenhouse gas mitigation 
projects in the electric power sector. Energy Policy 32 (4), 545-566 
 
Keppo, J., Lu, H., 2003. Real options and a large producer: the case of electricity markets. Energy 
Economics 25 (5), 459-472 
 
Kiriyama, E., Suzuki, A., 2004. Use of real options in nuclear power plant valuation in the presence of 
uncertainty with CO2 emission credit. Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology 41 (7), 756-764 
 
 25 
Klingelhöfer, H.E., 2004. Investment decisions and emissions trading. Paper presented in the 2nd joint 
research workshop on “Business and Emissions Trading”, Nov 3-5, Wittenberg.  
 
Knight, F.H., 1921. Risk, uncertainty and profit. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Boston,  Massachusetts. 
 
Koekebakker, S., Sødal, S., 2001. The value of an operating electricity production unit. Working 
paper 14/2001. Agder University College, Kristiansand. 
 
Koljonen, T., Kekkonen, V., Lehtilä, A., Hongisto, M., Savolainen, I., 2004. The impacts of emissions 
trading in Finnish energy and metal industries. VTT Research Notes 2259. (In Finnish) 
 
Krey, M., 2005. Transaction costs of unilateral CDM projects in India – results from an empirical 
survey. Energy Policy 33 (18), 2385-2397. 
 
Ku, A., 1995. Modelling Uncertainty in Electricity Capacity Planning. Ph.D. Thesis. London Business 
School. 
 
Kumbaroglu, G., Madlener, R., Demirel, M., 2004. A real options evaluation model for the diffusion 
prospects of new renewable power generation technologies. CEPE Working Paper No. 35. Zürich. 
 
Lambie, N. R., 2002. Analysing the Effect of a Distribution of Carbon Permits on Firm Investment. 
Paper presented at the 46th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource 
Economics Society, 13-15 February, Canberra. 
 
Langniss, O., Praetorius, B., 2005. How much market do market-based instruments create? An 
analysis for the case of “white” certificates. Energy Policy (In press). 
 
Lashof., D., Hargrave, T., Keller, S., 1997. Output-based allocation of emission allowances. 
Discussion draft. Natural Resource Defense Council. Washington D.C. 
 
Laughton, D.G., Jacoby, H.D, 1995. The effects of reversion on commodity projects of different 
length. In: Trigeorgis, L. (Ed) Real options in capital investment – models, strategies and applications. 
Praeger, Westport, CA. 
 
Laurikka, H., Pirilä, P., 2005. Investment appraisal of heat and power plants within an emissions 
trading scheme. Final Report of the INVIS project. Helsinki University of Technology. 
 
Lazarus, M., Kartha, S., Bernow, S., 2001. Project baselines and boundaries – for project based GHG 
emission reduction trading. Tellus Institute, Seattle. 
 
Lecocq, F., 2004. State and trends of the carbon market 2004. World Bank. Washington. 
 
Lecocq, F., Capoor, K., 2005. State and trends of the carbon market 2005. International Emissions 
Trading Association. World Bank. Washington. 
 
Lintner, J., 1965. The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock 
Portfolios and Capital Budgets, Review of Economics and Statistics 47, 13-37 
 
Liski, M., 1997. On the regulation of pollution and polluters’ long-term compliance strategies. Helsinki 
School of Economics and Business Administration. Acta Universitatis Oeconmicae Helsingiensis A-
129. 
 
 26 
Liski, M., 2001. Thin vs. Thick CO2 market. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
41 (3), 295-311 
 
Lund, D., 1993. The log-normal diffusion is hardly an equilibrium price process for exhaustible 
resources. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 235-241 
 
Lyon, R.M., 1982. Auctions and alternative procedures for allocating emission rights. Land 
Economics, 58 (1), 16-32 
 
March, J.G., Shapira, Z., 1987. Managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking. Management 
Science 33 (11), 1404-1418 
 
March, J. G., Simon, H.A., 1958. Cognitive limits on rationality. In Organizations. John Wiley & Sons. 
New York. 
 
Markowitz, H., 1952. Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance 7 (1), 77-91 
 
McDonald, R., Siegel, D., 1985. Investment and the valuation of firms when there is an option to shut 
down, International Economic Review 26 (2), 331-349 
 
McKibbin, W.J., Wilcoxen, P.J., 2002. The role of economics in climate change policy, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 16, 107-129 
 
McKibbin, W.J., Wilcoxen, P.J., 2004. Estimates of the costs of Kyoto: Marrakesh versus the 
McKibbin-Wilcoxen blueprint. Energy Policy, Vol. 32, Issue 4, 467-479 
 
Merton, R.C., 1973. Theory of rational option pricing. Bell Journal of Economics and Management 4 
(1), 141-153 
 
Metcalf, G.E., Investment under alternative return assumptions - comparing random walks and mean 
reversion. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 19, Issue 8, 1471-1488 
 
Michaelowa, A., 1998. Joint implementation – the baseline issue: economic and political aspects. 
Global Environmental Change, Vol. 8 (1), 81-92 
 
Michaelowa, A., Krey, M., Butzengeiger, S., 2004. Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation – new instruments for financing renewable energy technologies. Thematic 
background paper. International Conference for Renewable Energies, Bonn.  
 
Michaelowa, A., Jotzo, F., 2005. Transaction costs, institutional rigidities, and the size of the clean 
development mechanism. Energy Policy 33 (4), 511-523 
 
Modigliani, F., Miller, M.H., 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of 
investment. American Economic Review, Vol. 48, 261-297 
 
Mohr, E., 1992. Tradable emission permits for controlling greenhouse gases and complementary 
policies. In: OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 1992. Climate 
change: designing a tradeable permit system. Paris. 
 
Montero, J.P.,1998. Marketable pollution permits with uncertainty and transaction costs. Resource 
and Energy Economics, Vol. 20, Issue 1, 27-50 
 
 27 
Montero, J.P., 2000. Optimal design of a phase-in emissions trading program. Journal of Public  
Economics, Vol. 75, Issue 2, 273-291 
 
Montero, J.P., 2002. Prices vs. quantities with incomplete enforcement. Journal of Public Economics 
85 (3), 435-454 
 
Montgomery, W.D., 1972. Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of 
Economic Theory 5 (6), 395-418 
 
MTI (Ministry of Trade and Industry, Finland), 2005. Kioton mekanismien hallinnoinnin työnjako ja 
resurssit – Mekanismien hallinnointityöryhmän mietintö. KTM Julkaisuja 3/2005. (In Finnish) 
 
Murto, P., 2003. On investment, uncertainty, and strategic interaction with applications in energy 
markets. Systems Analysis Laboratory Research Reports A 84. Helsinki University of Technology. 
 
Myers, S.C., 2001. Finance theory and financial strategy. In: Schwartz, E., Trigeorgis, L. (ed), 2001. 
Real options and investment under uncertainty: classical readings and recent contributions, 19-32 
 
Määttä, K., 1997. Environmental taxes – from an economic idea to a legal institution. Finnish 
Lawyers’ Publishing, Helsinki. 
 
Nakamura, M., Nakashima, T., Niimura, T., 2005. Electricity markets volatility: estimates, regularities 
and risk management applications. Energy Policy (In press). 
 
Newell, R.G., Pizer, W.A., 2003. Regulating stock externalities under uncertainty. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 45 (2), 416-432 
 
Noll, R.G., 1982. Implementing marketable emissions permits. American Econ. Rev. 72 (2), 120-124 
 
Näsäkkälä, E., Fleten, S.E., 2004a. Gas fired power plants: investment timing, operating flexibility and 
abandonment. Submitted manuscript (Version: September 24, 2004). Working paper 04-03. 
Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management, Norwegian University of Science 
and Technology. 
 
Näsäkkälä, E., Fleten, S.E., 2004b. Flexibility and technology choice in gas fired power plant 
investments. Forthcoming in Review of Financial Economics. 
 
OECD/IEA (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / International Energy 
Agency), 1999. Electricity reform – power generation costs and investment.  Paris. 
 
OECD/IEA (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / International Energy 
Agency), 2000. Emission baselines – estimating the unknown.  Paris. 
 
OECD/IEA (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / International Energy 
Agency), 2003. Power generation investment in electricity markets. Paris.  
 
PCF (Prototype Carbon Fund), 2003. PCF Annual Report 2002. www.prototypecarbonfund.org. 
 
Pearce, D.W., Turner, R.K., 1990. Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment. Harvester 
Wheatsleaf, Exeter. 
 
Peterson, S., Klepper, G., 2004. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme — Allowance Prices, Trade 
Flows, Competitiveness Effects. European Environmental Journal 14, pp. 201-218. 
 28 
 
Pindyck, R.S., 1993. Investments of uncertain cost. Journal of Financial Economics 34, 53-76 
 
Pindyck, R.S., 1999. The long-run evolution of energy prices. The Energy Journal. 20 (2), 1- 27 
 
Pizer, W.A., 2002. Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate  global climate change. Journal 
of Public Economics 85, 409-434. 
 
PROBASE (Procedures for Accounting and Baselines for JI and CDM projects), 2003. Final Report. 
EU fifth framework programme.  
 
PWC, 2003. Allowance allocation within the community-wide emission allowance trading scheme. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Utrecht.  
 
Rajagopalan, N., Rasheed, M.A., Datta, D.K. (1993) Strategic Decision Processes: Critical Review 
and Future Directions. Journal of Management. Vol. 19, No. 2., 349-384 
 
Reilly, F. K., Norton, E. A., 1999. Investments. Fifth Edition. The Dryden Press. Orlando. 
 
Reinaud, J., 2003. Emissions trading and its possible impacts on investment decisions in the power 
sector. IEA information paper. Paris. 
 
Rentz, H., 1998. Joint implementation and the question of ‘additionality’ – a proposal for a pragmatic 
approach to identify possible joint implementation projects. Energy Policy, Vol. 26 (4), 275-279 
 
Roberts, M.J., Spence, M., 1976. Effluent charges and licences under uncertainty. Journal of Public 
Economics 5 (3)(4), 193-208 
 
Rong, A., Lahdelma, R. (2005) Risk analysis of expansion planning of combined heat and power 
energy system under emissions trading scheme. Paper presented in IASTED International 
Conference on Energy and Power Systems. Krabi, Thailand, April 18-20. 
 
Rosenzweig, R., Varilek, M., Janssen, J., 2002. The emerging international GHG market. Pew Center 
on Global Climate Change. 
 
Rubin, J., Kling, K., 1993. An emission saved is an emission earned: an empirical study of emission 
banking for light-duty vehicle manufacturers. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management  
25 (3), 257-274 
 
Rubin, J., 1996. A model of intertemporal emission trading, banking and borrowing. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 31 (3), 269-286 
 
Sandal, G., Sjögren, S., 2003. Capital budgeting methods among Sweden’s largest groups of 
companies: the state of the art and a comparison with earlier studies. International Journal of 
Production Economics  84 (1), 51-69 
 
Sandoff, A., 2003. Aktörernas drivkrafter för investeringar i energisystemet – en intervjustudie. In: 
Ryden, B (ed) Nordleden – slutrapport för etapp 2, Gothenburg, 215-236 (In Swedish) 
 
Sarkar, S., 2003. The effect of mean reversion on investment under uncertainty. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, Vol. 28, 377-396 
 
 29 
Sarkis, J., Tamarkin, M., 2004. Real options analysis for renewable energy technologies in a GHG 
emission trading environment. Paper presented in the 2nd Business and Emissions Trading 
Workshop, 3-5 November, Wittenberg. Germany. 
 
Sathaye, J., Murtishaw, S., Price, L., Lefranc, M., Roy, J., Winkler, H., Spalding-Fecher, R., 2004. 
Multiproject baselines for evaluation of electric power projects. Energy Policy 32 (11), 1303-1317 
 
Schwartz, E.S., 1997. The stochastic behavior of commodity pricing: implications for valuation and 
hedging. Journal of Finance 52 (3), 923-973 
 
Schwartz, E.S., Trigeorgis, L., (eds) 2001. Real options and investment under uncertainty – classical 
readings and recent contributions. The MIT Press. Cambridge, MA. 
  
Shank, J.K., 1996. Analysing technology investment – from NPV to strategic cost management 
(SCM). Management Accounting Research, 7, 185-197 
 
Sharpe, W.F., 1964. Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 
Journal of Finance, 19, 425-442 
 
Sharpe, W. F., Alexander, G. J., Bailey, J. V., 1999. Investments. Sixth Edition. Prentice-Hall. New 
Jersey. 
 
Shipworth, D., 2003. Hitting emissions targets with a (statistical) confidence in multi-instrument 
emissions trading schemes. Climate Policy 3 (Supplement 2), S75-S87 
 
Simonsen, I., 2003. Measuring anti-correlations in the Nordic electricity spot market by wavelets. 
Physica A, 283 (3), 597-606 
 
Spalding-Fecher, R., Thorne, S., Warnukonya, N., 2002. Residential solar water heating as a 
potential Clean Development Mechanism project: a South African case study. Mitigation and 
Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 7 (2), 135-153 
 
Spangardt, G., Lucht, M., Wolf, C., Horn, C., 2003. Decision-making in the emissions-market under 
uncertainty. Paper presented in the 1st “Business and Emissions Trading”-workshop, 11-14 
November, Wittenberg. 
 
Springer, U., 2003. Portfolio diversification of investments in climate change mitigation. Dissertation 
Nr. 2831 of the University of St. Gallen. Difo-Druck, Bamberg. 
 
Stavins, R.N., 1995. Transaction costs and tradeable permits. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 29 (2), 133-148 
 
Stavins, R.N., 1996. Correlated uncertainty and policy instrument choice. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 30 (2), 218-232 
 
Sugiyama, T., Michaelowa, A., 2001. Reconciling the design of CDM with inborn paradox of 
additionality concept. Climate Policy, Vol. 1 (1), 75-83 
 
Teisberg, E.O., 1993. Capital investment strategies under uncertain regulation. The Rand Journal of 
Economics 24 (4), 591-604 
 
Teisberg, E.O., 1994. An option valuation analysis of investment choices by a regulated firm. 
Management Science 40 (4), 535-548  
 30 
 
Teisberg, E.O., 1995. Methods for evaluating capital investment decisions under uncertainty. In: 
Trigeorgis, L., 1995 (ed) Real options in capital investment – models, strategies and applications. 
Praeger, Westport, CT, 31-46 
 
Tietenberg, T., 1985. Emissions trading – an exercise in reforming pollution policy. Resources for the 
Future. Washington D.C. 
 
Tietenberg, T., 1992. Relevant experience with tradable entitlements. In: UNCTAD (ed) (1992) 
Combating global warming: study on a global system of tradable carbon emission entitlements. 
United Nations. New York, 37-54 
 
Tietenberg, T., Grubb, M., Michaelowa, A., Swift, B., Zhang, Z., 1999. International rules for 
greenhouse gas emissions trading: defining the principles, modalities, rules and guidelines for 
verification, reporting, and accountability. United Nations. New York and Geneva. 
 
Trigeorgis, L., 1995 (ed) Real options in capital investment – models, strategies and applications. 
Praeger, Westport, CT. 
 
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), 2005. www.unfccc.int. 
 
van Vuuren, D.P., Cofala., J., Eerens, H.E., Oostenrijk,  R., Heyes, C., Klimont, Z., den Elzen, M.G.J., 
Amann, M., 2005. Exploring the ancillary benefits of the Kyoto Protocol for air pollution in Europe. 
Forthcoming in Energy Policy. 
 
Vehmas, J., Kaivo-oja, J., Luukkanen, J., Malaska, P., 1999. Environmental taxes on fuels and 
electricity – some experiences from the Nordic countries. Energy Policy, Vol. 27, Issue 6, 343-355 
 
Vehviläinen, I., 2004. Applying mathematical finance tools to the competitive Nordic electricity market. 
Helsinki University of Technology, Institute of Mathematics, Research Reports A 475. 
 
Venetsanos, K., Angelopoulou, P., Renewable energy sources project appraisal under uncertainty: 
the case of wind energy exploitation within a changing energy market environment. Energy Policy 30, 
293-307 
 
Ventosa, M., Baíllo, A., Ramos, A., Rivier, M., 2005. Electricity market modeling trends. Energy Policy 
33 (7), 897-913  
 
Watson, W.D., Ridker, R.G., 1984. Losses from effluent taxes and quotas under uncertainty. Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management 11, 310-316 
 
Weber, C., Swider, D., 2004. Power plant investments under fuel and carbon price uncertainty. Paper 
presented at the 6th IAEE European Conference on Modelling in Energy Economics and Policy.  
 
Weidlich, A., Sensfuss, F., Genoese, M., Veit, D., 2004. Studying the effects of CO2 emissions 
trading on the electricity market – a multi-agent-based approach.  Proceedings of the 2nd Joint 
Research Workshop “Business and Emissions Trading”, Wittenberg, 3-5 November, Springer Physica 
 
Weitzman, M. L., 1974. Price vs. Quantities. Review of Economic Studies, Oct  41 (4), 477-491 
 
Weron, R., Przybyłowicz, B., 2000. Hurst Analysis of electricity price dynamics. Physica A, 283, 462-
468 
 
 31 
White, D.E., Rutherford, S.P., Borghi, M.J., 2000. The role of volatility value in power plant financing. 
The Journal of Project Finance, Summer, 23-31 
 
Willems, S., 2000. Framework for baseline guidelines. OECD information paper. Paris. 
 
Woerdman, E., 2001. Emissions trading and transaction costs: analyzing the flaws in the discussion. 
Ecological economics 38, 293-304 
 
Yan, J., 2001. Essays on the investment behavior of independent power producers in the US 
electricity industry under regulatory restructuring. Doctoral dissertation. Department of Economics. 
Stanford University.  
 
Zhang, Z.X., 1999. International greenhouse gas emissions trading: who should be liable for the non-
compliance by sellers? Ecological economics 31 (3), 323-329 
 
ISBN 951-22-7941-X
ISBN 951-22-7942-8 (PDF)
ISSN 1795-2239
ISSN 1795-4584 (PDF)
